The “Golden Decade” of Multifamily & What Fueled the Boom with Reed Goossens

The “Golden Decade” of Multifamily, Why It Boomed, and Why Distress Is Different Now

On Accredited Investors Only, host Peter Neill sits down with Reed Goossens, founder of RSN Property Group, to unpack what fueled the “golden decade” of multifamily, what broke during the downturn, and how experienced operators are adapting their underwriting and strategy for today’s market.

Reed’s core message is simple but important: the last few years of multifamily weakness were not mainly caused by buildings falling apart. They were driven by the capital stack and the way economics were distorted, then corrected. If you understand that difference, opportunities become clearer.

The origin story: from structural engineering to $900M multifamily

Reed’s path to real estate syndications was not a straight line. He came to the U.S. from Australia in 2012, initially chasing opportunity. His background was in structural engineering, which helped shape how he thinks about physical assets, construction realities, and the “work behind the numbers.”

Early on, he bought property quickly. He went from his first small deal (a triplex-style setup) to building syndication companies and scaling across major Sunbelt markets. Over time, RSN became a sponsor for deals totaling more than $900 million in acquisitions.

Why the U.S. multifamily cycle created a “golden decade”

Reed describes the 2012 to 2022 era as a golden run for multifamily, especially for operators who understood how to raise capital and execute value-add business plans during favorable market conditions.

What changed after 2012

One major catalyst Reed points to is the JOBS Act changing capital formation, which altered how many investors could participate and how sponsors could raise funds. That helped fuel a boom where it became common to refinance, improve leverage, and chase quick business improvements.

In the easiest versions of that decade, some operators could deliver eye-catching returns quickly. But Reed emphasizes that those results were largely supported by tailwinds, not magic.

Rent growth was “supported,” not guaranteed

Rent growth during the upswing felt straightforward because many players were operating with assumptions that later proved fragile. Reed explains that temporary forces pushed rents higher than what fundamentals would have predicted on their own.

That matters today, because when the distortions faded, rent rolls reset.

Why distress happened: not mainly operations, mostly financing

Reed is blunt about the nature of the downturn: today’s distress has been more financial than operational. Many investors assumed the problem was “buildings” or “bad management.” Reed argues the bigger issue was capital stack pressure.

Black swan factors that distorted the market

Several overlapping shocks contributed to the reset:

  • COVID-era stimulus boosted consumer ability to pay, inflating rent expectations.
  • Stimulus dried up, and renters’ budgets corrected downward.
  • Oversupply
  • Higher interest rates

Reed ties this together with an important underwriting reality: if you modeled a rent roll at one point in time, and the “snapshot” was temporarily inflated, you can end up overpaying or overestimating the stabilization timeline.

From “extending and pretending” to forced resolution

Reed also highlights a market dynamic that shows up in negotiations with lenders: for a period, some borrowers used extensions and runway to avoid default or liquidation. Now, time is running out, and lenders want out.

That is why he sees far more opportunities today that look like distressed acquisition cases where the seller has to sell.

Have rents bottomed? Reed’s stabilization thesis

Reed believes the rent drop has bottomed out and begun stabilizing, particularly across Sunbelt markets where he operates.

Why rent pressure should ease (and potentially reverse)

He points to a supply-demand shift that is taking time to unwind:

  • New supply is being absorbed in many Sunbelt states (or is close to being absorbed).
  • As supply gets digested, vacancies ease, and renewal pricing improves.
  • Interest rates are higher, which makes it harder to “buy your way out” by building or refinancing into cheaper debt.

Reed’s view is that the market “cycled down” and is now “cycling back up.” He also believes the affordability squeeze is sustaining long-term renter demand.

Long-term housing demand still wins

A major long-term driver in his thesis is the U.S. housing shortage. Reed notes that the country needs well over 7 million homes to keep up with population expansion. That demand problem does not disappear because a few quarters got ugly.

Supply, rates, and why it is harder to start new projects

Reed draws a historical comparison to the early 1970s: when rates are cheap, construction accelerates. Then the system runs into the limits of demand, and rents correct.

Today’s version of that story looks like:

  • Low rates previously encouraged more building.
  • New units hit the market and pushed rents down.
  • Now rates make “shovels in the ground” less economical, slowing new supply growth.

The implication for investors is not that rent will grow in a straight line, but that the forces driving oversupply are changing.

Investor confidence is resetting: expectations must normalize

Reed says the downturn created widespread bruises for retail and semi-institutional investors. That includes capital losses and deal delays, which understandably reduced enthusiasm.

His practical point is that confidence is rebuilt through:

  • Transparency and data (discount to peak pricing, realistic rent growth assumptions).
  • Demonstrated experience (operators who have bought through cycles, not only during the boom).
  • Clear time horizons (real estate is not a quick flip, especially multifamily).

Real estate is a medium to long-term game

Reed emphasizes a correction in investors’ mindset. During the golden decade, some value-add returns happened fast. But he argues that larger multifamily transformations commonly take 2 to 3 years, and sometimes longer, before returns fully materialize (years four, five, and six are often where the “real gravy” shows up).

How technology changed underwriting and competition

Reed identifies a “fifth market” that investors often ignore: technology. Ten years ago, access to rental comparables, market data, and deal benchmarking was much less available. Today, the information gap is smaller.

This means:

  • Barriers to entry are lower.
  • Ambiguity in underwriting has reduced.
  • Cap rates and risk tolerance are more widely shared and quickly competed for.
  • Returns have become more “commoditized,” requiring operators to be sharper, not luckier.

What deals are penciling now: distress, basis, and market-driven buy boxes

When asked what he looks for in today’s environment, Reed’s answer goes beyond “find a low cap rate.” He focuses on the basis play and the reality of what the market is offering at sale time.

Go beyond the going-in cap rate

Reed argues that on truly distressed deals, the entry price matters more than simplistic yields. He gives a conceptual example: an asset might have peaked at a much higher price, but in distress, it can trade at a significantly lower per-door basis. Even if you invest into renovations and stabilize rents, you still need to underwrite the full path from bargain entry to realistic stabilization.

Underwrite where you have operational credibility

Reed also says he underwrites best in markets where the sponsor has lived experience. Knowing local rent ranges and tenant behavior reduces guesswork and makes underwriting more honest.

Let the market dictate your strategy

One of Reed’s most practical frameworks is that a “buy box” can’t be static. The market’s “sell box” changes. That means your strategy, financing approach, and expected timeline need to adapt.

In periods of attractive interest-rate spreads, agency debt and positive leverage can work well. In periods of credit stress or bad-debt complications, Reed is willing to use other structures like bridge debt despite prior preferences, because the timing of the market may require it.

Agency vs bridge debt: why capital structure is the battleground

Reed describes how certain deals qualify for agency loans only when the balance sheet is clean enough. Distressed assets sometimes cannot use agency products because they carry too much bad debt or complexity. When that happens, pricing alone can create opportunity, but financing must fit the reality of the deal.

This is a major reason the capital cycle matters so much right now. The same property might be “a great deal” or “a terrible deal” depending on what debt is available and at what rate.

Where RSN is looking: Sunbelt focus and MSA scaling targets

Reed says RSN targets Sunbelt MSAs, including:

  • Texas (including Dallas)
  • Phoenix
  • Carolinas
  • Atlanta
  • Other Sunbelt growth pockets as opportunities arise (example mentioned: Gainesville, Georgia)

He also shares an operating preference: in each MSA, they aim to build toward 700,000 to 1,000,000 doors (as stated in the conversation, framed around scaling to attract full-time regional leadership and economies of scale). The key intent is that they want enough market presence to support strong execution without becoming too dependent on one provider.

Operational approach: in-house asset management, localized property teams

Reed emphasizes that operations still matter, but the organizational design matters too.

  • Asset management in-house
  • Construction management in-house
  • Third-party property management, but localized by region
  • Preference for property management partners that stay small enough to treat the sponsor as meaningful, but large enough to have deep local expertise

The idea is to protect quality while maintaining local execution strength. Reed also flags construction and renovation execution as especially crucial, because they directly influence unit turns, resident satisfaction, and long-term performance.

So, is now a good time to buy?

Reed’s conclusion is cautiously optimistic. His view is that stabilization is beginning, distress is increasing because older credit solutions are expiring, and long-term housing demand is still pointing upward.

He also notes a behavioral shift in the market: when deals were scarce and competition was intense, everyone was trying to get deals done quickly. Now, with financing pressure and extended decision timelines, there is more selectivity. He expects more work before offers become funded, and less “email it and fund it” speed.

Key takeaways for investors navigating today’s multifamily cycle

  • Distress is often capital-driven, not operations-driven. Your underwriting must respect the stack.
  • Rent resets can be real. Stimulus and oversupply distort rents, then later correct them.
  • Long-term demand still supports multifamily. The U.S. housing shortage remains significant.
  • Reset expectations. Real estate is a medium- to long-term investment, not a guaranteed quick flip.
  • Underwrite basis and market timing. Use the market’s sell conditions, not the market’s past peak assumptions.

If you want to engage with RSN Property Group or follow Reed Goossens, he points investors to: